Commit 0fd3fd0a authored by Ilya Dryomov's avatar Ilya Dryomov
Browse files

libceph: handle an empty authorize reply

The authorize reply can be empty, for example when the ticket used to
build the authorizer is too old and TAG_BADAUTHORIZER is returned from
the service.  Calling ->verify_authorizer_reply() results in an attempt
to decrypt and validate (somewhat) random data in au->buf (most likely
the signature block from calc_signature()), which fails and ends up in
con_fault_finish() with !con->auth_retry.  The ticket isn't invalidated
and the connection is retried again and again until a new ticket is
obtained from the monitor:

  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply

Let TAG_BADAUTHORIZER handler kick in and increment con->auth_retry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c056fdc ("libceph: verify authorize reply on connect")
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/20164

Signed-off-by: default avatarIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
parent a3b22b9f
...@@ -2058,6 +2058,8 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) ...@@ -2058,6 +2058,8 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
if (con->auth) { if (con->auth) {
int len = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
/* /*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer() * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
* should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and
...@@ -2067,8 +2069,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) ...@@ -2067,8 +2069,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
*/ */
if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) { if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) {
ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge( ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(
con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, len);
le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len));
if (ret < 0) if (ret < 0)
return ret; return ret;
...@@ -2078,10 +2079,12 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) ...@@ -2078,10 +2079,12 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
return 0; return 0;
} }
ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con); if (len) {
if (ret < 0) { ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; if (ret < 0) {
return ret; con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
return ret;
}
} }
} }
......
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