1. 16 Nov, 2016 1 commit
  2. 13 Sep, 2016 4 commits
  3. 05 Sep, 2016 2 commits
  4. 08 Jul, 2016 1 commit
    • Borislav Petkov's avatar
      x86/mce: Fix mce_rdmsrl() warning message · 38c54ccb
      Borislav Petkov authored
      
      
      The MSR address we're dumping in there should be in hex, otherwise we
      get funsies like:
      
        [    0.016000] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c:428 mce_rdmsrl+0xd9/0xe0
        [    0.016000] mce: Unable to read msr -1073733631!
      				       ^^^^^^^^^^^
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467968983-4874-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
      
      
      [ Fixed capitalization of 'MSR'. ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      38c54ccb
  5. 07 Jul, 2016 1 commit
  6. 12 May, 2016 1 commit
  7. 03 May, 2016 6 commits
  8. 13 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  9. 18 Feb, 2016 2 commits
  10. 01 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  11. 19 Dec, 2015 1 commit
    • Ashok Raj's avatar
      x86/mce: Ensure offline CPUs don't participate in rendezvous process · d90167a9
      Ashok Raj authored
      
      
      Intel's MCA implementation broadcasts MCEs to all CPUs on the
      node. This poses a problem for offlined CPUs which cannot
      participate in the rendezvous process:
      
        Kernel panic - not syncing: Timeout: Not all CPUs entered broadcast exception handler
        Kernel Offset: disabled
        Rebooting in 100 seconds..
      
      More specifically, Linux does a soft offline of a CPU when
      writing a 0 to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/online, which
      doesn't prevent the #MC exception from being broadcasted to that
      CPU.
      
      Ensure that offline CPUs don't participate in the MCE rendezvous
      and clear the RIP valid status bit so that a second MCE won't
      cause a shutdown.
      
      Without the patch, mce_start() will increment mce_callin and
      wait for all CPUs. Offlined CPUs should avoid participating in
      the rendezvous process altogether.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
      [ Massage commit message. ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449742346-21470-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      d90167a9
  12. 24 Nov, 2015 4 commits
  13. 01 Nov, 2015 2 commits
  14. 28 Sep, 2015 1 commit
    • Ashok Raj's avatar
      x86/mce: Don't clear shared banks on Intel when offlining CPUs · 6e06780a
      Ashok Raj authored
      
      
      It is not safe to clear global MCi_CTL banks during CPU offline
      or suspend/resume operations. These MSRs are either
      thread-scoped (meaning private to a thread), or core-scoped
      (private to threads in that core only), or with a socket scope:
      visible and controllable from all threads in the socket.
      
      When we offline a single CPU, clearing those MCi_CTL bits will
      stop signaling for all the shared, i.e., socket-wide resources,
      such as LLC, iMC, etc.
      
      In addition, it might be possible to compromise the integrity of
      an Intel Secure Guard eXtentions (SGX) system if the attacker
      has control of the host system and is able to inject errors
      which would be otherwise ignored when MCi_CTL bits are cleared.
      
      Hence on SGX enabled systems, if MCi_CTL is cleared, SGX gets
      disabled.
      Tested-by: default avatarSerge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
      [ Cleanup text. ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441391390-16985-1-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6e06780a
  15. 13 Aug, 2015 8 commits
  16. 22 Jul, 2015 1 commit
  17. 07 Jul, 2015 1 commit
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86/entry: Remove exception_enter() from most trap handlers · 8c84014f
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      
      
      On 64-bit kernels, we don't need it any more: we handle context
      tracking directly on entry from user mode and exit to user mode.
      
      On 32-bit kernels, we don't support context tracking at all, so
      these callbacks had no effect.
      
      Note: this doesn't change do_page_fault().  Before we do that,
      we need to make sure that there is no code that can page fault
      from kernel mode with CONTEXT_USER.  The 32-bit fast system call
      stack argument code is the only offender I'm aware of right now.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ae22f4dfebd799c916574089964592be218151f9.1435952415.git.luto@kernel.org
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8c84014f
  18. 06 Jul, 2015 2 commits