Commit 704b836c authored by Oleg Nesterov's avatar Oleg Nesterov Committed by James Morris
Browse files

mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec



The problem is minor, but without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race
with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds.

Now we do not need to re-check task->mm after ptrace_may_access(), it
can't be changed to the new mm under us.

Strictly speaking, this also fixes another very minor problem. Unless
security check fails or the task exits mm_for_maps() should never
return NULL, the caller should get either old or new ->mm.
Signed-off-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
parent 00f89d21
......@@ -234,19 +234,19 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task);
struct mm_struct *mm;
if (mm && mm != current->mm) {
/*
* task->mm can be changed before security check,
* in that case we must notice the change after.
*/
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
mm != task->mm) {
mmput(mm);
mm = NULL;
}
if (mutex_lock_killable(&task->cred_guard_mutex))
return NULL;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm && mm != current->mm &&
!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
mmput(mm);
mm = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
return mm;
}
......
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