1. 28 Feb, 2016 19 commits
  2. 15 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  3. 01 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  4. 31 Jan, 2016 3 commits
  5. 09 Dec, 2015 1 commit
  6. 09 Nov, 2015 4 commits
  7. 22 Oct, 2015 2 commits
    • Li Bin's avatar
      arm64: ftrace: fix function_graph tracer panic · 249af812
      Li Bin authored
      commit ee556d00
      When function graph tracer is enabled, the following operation
      will trigger panic:
      mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel
      echo next_tgid > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
      echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
      ls /proc/
      ------------[ cut here ]------------
      [  198.501417] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address cb88537fdc8ba316
      [  198.506126] pgd = ffffffc008f79000
      [  198.509363] [cb88537fdc8ba316] *pgd=00000000488c6003, *pud=00000000488c6003, *pmd=0000000000000000
      [  198.517726] Internal error: Oops: 94000005 [#1] SMP
      [  198.518798] Modules linked in:
      [  198.520582] CPU: 1 PID: 1388 Comm: ls Tainted: G
      [  198.521800] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
      [  198.522852] task: ffffffc0fa9e8000 ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 task.ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000
      [  198.524306] PC is at next_tgid+0x30/0x100
      [  198.525205] LR is at return_to_handler+0x0/0x20
      [  198.526090] pc : [<ffffffc0002a1070>] lr : [<ffffffc0000907c0>] pstate: 60000145
      [  198.527392] sp : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
      [  198.528084] x29: ffffffc0f9ab3d40 x28: ffffffc0f9ab0000
      [  198.529406] x27: ffffffc000d6a000 x26: ffffffc000b786e8
      [  198.530659] x25: ffffffc0002a1900 x24: ffffffc0faf16c00
      [  198.531942] x23: ffffffc0f9ab3ea0 x22: 0000000000000002
      [  198.533202] x21: ffffffc000d85050 x20: 0000000000000002
      [  198.534446] x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000000
      [  198.535719] x17: 000000000049fa08 x16: ffffffc000242efc
      [  198.537030] x15: 0000007fa472b54c x14: ffffffffff000000
      [  198.538347] x13: ffffffc0fada84a0 x12: 0000000000000001
      [  198.539634] x11: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 x10: ffffffc0f9ab3d70
      [  198.540915] x9 : ffffffc0000907c0 x8 : ffffffc0f9ab3d40
      [  198.542215] x7 : 0000002e330f08f0 x6 : 0000000000000015
      [  198.543508] x5 : 0000000000000f08 x4 : ffffffc0f9835ec0
      [  198.544792] x3 : cb88537fdc8ba316 x2 : cb88537fdc8ba306
      [  198.546108] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffc000d85050
      [  198.547432]
      [  198.547920] Process ls (pid: 1388, stack limit = 0xffffffc0f9ab0020)
      [  198.549170] Stack: (0xffffffc0f9ab3d40 to 0xffffffc0f9ab4000)
      [  198.582568] Call trace:
      [  198.583313] [<ffffffc0002a1070>] next_tgid+0x30/0x100
      [  198.584359] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
      [  198.585503] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
      [  198.586574] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
      [  198.587660] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70
      [  198.588896] Code: aa0003f5 2a0103f4 b4000102 91004043 (885f7c60)
      [  198.591092] ---[ end trace 6a346f8f20949ac8 ]---
      This is because when using function graph tracer, if the traced
      function return value is in multi regs ([x0-x7]), return_to_handler
      may corrupt them. So in return_to_handler, the parameter regs should
      be protected properly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLi Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    • Ard Biesheuvel's avatar
      arm64/efi: Fix boot crash by not padding between EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME regions · b23b63c2
      Ard Biesheuvel authored
      commit 0ce3cc00
      The new Properties Table feature introduced in UEFIv2.5 may
      split memory regions that cover PE/COFF memory images into
      separate code and data regions. Since these regions only differ
      in the type (runtime code vs runtime data) and the permission
      bits, but not in the memory type attributes (UC/WC/WT/WB), the
      spec does not require them to be aligned to 64 KB.
      Since the relative offset of PE/COFF .text and .data segments
      cannot be changed on the fly, this means that we can no longer
      pad out those regions to be mappable using 64 KB pages.
      Unfortunately, there is no annotation in the UEFI memory map
      that identifies data regions that were split off from a code
      region, so we must apply this logic to all adjacent runtime
      regions whose attributes only differ in the permission bits.
      So instead of rounding each memory region to 64 KB alignment at
      both ends, only round down regions that are not directly
      preceded by another runtime region with the same type
      attributes. Since the UEFI spec does not mandate that the memory
      map be sorted, this means we also need to sort it first.
      Note that this change will result in all EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
      regions whose start addresses are not aligned to the OS page
      size to be mapped with executable permissions (i.e., on kernels
      compiled with 64 KB pages). However, since these mappings are
      only active during the time that UEFI Runtime Services are being
      invoked, the window for abuse is rather small.
      Tested-by: default avatarMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [UEFI 2.4 only]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-3-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  8. 29 Sep, 2015 4 commits
  9. 13 Sep, 2015 1 commit
  10. 17 Aug, 2015 2 commits
    • Amanieu d'Antras's avatar
      signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_from_user32 · 52124831
      Amanieu d'Antras authored
      commit 3c00cb5e
      This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
      positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
      in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
      between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
      copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
      rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
      of si_code.
      This fixes the following information leaks:
      x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
             itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
             (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
      x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
             a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
      sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
             64-bit process. (si_code = any)
      parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
      rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
      to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAmanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    • Amanieu d'Antras's avatar
      signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_to_user · c08a75d9
      Amanieu d'Antras authored
      commit 26135022
      This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to
      user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel
      stack data to user mode.
      Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same
      si_code value is shared between multiple signals.  This is solved by
      checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAmanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  11. 10 Aug, 2015 1 commit
  12. 03 Aug, 2015 1 commit