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  • Nicolas Iooss's avatar
    i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md command · 8f8c04bf
    Nicolas Iooss authored and Tom Rini's avatar Tom Rini committed
    When running "i2c md 0 0 80000100", the function do_i2c_md parses the
    length into an unsigned int variable named length. The value is then
    moved to a signed variable:
    
        int nbytes = length;
        #define DISP_LINE_LEN 16
        int linebytes = (nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN) ? DISP_LINE_LEN : nbytes;
        ret = dm_i2c_read(dev, addr, linebuf, linebytes);
    
    On systems where integers are 32 bits wide, 0x80000100 is a negative
    value to "nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN" is false and linebytes gets assigned
    0x80000100 instead of 16.
    
    The consequence is that the function which reads from the i2c device
    (dm_i2c_read or i2c_read) is called with a 16-byte stack buffer to fill
    but with a size parameter which is too large. In some cases, this could
    trigger a crash. But with some i2c drivers, such as drivers/i2c/nx_i2c.c
    (used with "nexell,s5pxx18-i2c" bus), the size is actually truncated to
    a 16-bit integer. This is because function i2c_transfer expects an
    unsigned short le...
    8f8c04bf